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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Donald Rossignol, Jr., appeals from the district court's Memorandum Decision
and Order in which the court denied Mr. Rossignol's petition for post-conviction relief.
Mr. Rossignol asserts that the district court erred in denying his claim that his counsel
were deficient in failing to inform him that the final decision on whether or not to testify
was his, and that there is a reasonable probability that but for his counsels' errors, the
result of his trial would have been different. Additionally, Mr. Rossignol asserts that his
counsel deprived him of his right to testify by failing to obtain a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver, and that the deprivation of this right was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Finally, Mr. Rossignol asserts that the district court erred in denying
his claim that his counsel were deficient in failing to timely subpoena and call to testify
the alleged victim's physician, Dr. Schmidt, and that there is a reasonable probability
that but for his counsels' errors, the result of his trial would have been different.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Rossignol was charged with three counts of lewd conduct and one count of
sexual abuse for conduct alleged to have occurred against his daughter in 2005, as well
as a persistent violator enhancement.

State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 820-821

(Ct. App. 2005). An initial jury trial resulted in a hung jury; however, after four days of
deliberation, the jury convicted Mr. Rossignol of all counts after a second trial. Id. (See
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Marshall, that he would have to testify in the second trial. Id. Mr. Marshall responded,
"[b]asically it was, well, that's something we'll have to consider.
(Tr., p.14, L.24 - p.15, L.3.)

We'll look at."

Mr. Rossignol repeated his desire to testify on multiple

occasions between the first and second trials. (Tr., p.17, L.19 - p.18, L.9.) Mr. Marshall
responded to these requests by stating that, "[h]e would discuss it"; however,
Mr. Rossignol testified, "[w]hen he said he would discuss things he always talked about
meaning discuss it with Sun ii Ramalingam and Tom Caldwell." (Tr., p.18, Ls.10-14.)4
Mr. Rossignol did not recall discussing his testifying during the trial prior to the close of
the defense case; however, after the court ruled the State could present a piece of
evidence on rebuttal they were not allowed to present during their case in chief,
Mr. Rossignol told his attorneys the jury would need to hear from him, and his attorneys
again told him that they would discuss it. (Tr., p.18, L.15 - p.19, L.13.) Mr. Rossignol
was not called to testify. (Tr., p.19, Ls.14-16.)
Mr. Rossignol knew that he had the right to testify; however, he believed that the
decision on whether or not he would be able to exercise that right belonged to his
attorney. (Tr. p.13, L.20 - p.14, L.23.) Although he could discuss strategy decisions
with his attorneys, Mr. Rossignol always believed that the final decisions belonged to
Mr. Marshall because, "[t]hat's how he always brought it out to us." (Tr., p.27, L.6 p.29, L.5.) His attorneys told Mr. Rossignol that they did not want him to testify based
upon the court's ruling that the State could present evidence that he had a prior
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Mr. Rossignol's counsel, David Marshall, also testified that exit interviews of jurors
from the first trial showed that "a few had told us in the interviews that they figured he
didn't testify because he was guilty." (Tr., p.58, Ls.4-7.)
4
Sunil Ramalingam acted as co-counsel and Tom Caldwell is an attorney in
Mr. Marshall's office. (Tr., p.13, Ls.11-12, p.24, Ls.9-14.)
3

that came up with S.R.

(Tr., p.21, Ls.11-21.)

Mr. Rossignol wanted to "explain

everything from day one on. Let them know, I mean, this is what happened, okay ...
and that I'm not a person that would do the things that I was being accused of doing,
and the only way they could see that is by hearing me." (Tr., p.21, L.22 - p.22, L.3.)
Regarding Dr. Schmidt, Mr. Rossignol expected that had he been called as a
witness during the case, he would have testified that he was S.R.'s physician, that he
had seen her approximately 12 times around the time of the alleged abuse, and that he
never saw or heard anything to make him have any concern that S.R. was being
abused. (Tr., p.24, L.15 - p.26, L.19.)
Both David Marshall and Sunil Ramalingam testified echoing Mr. Rossignol's
testimony that he stated repeatedly that he wanted to testify, and that they advised him
that he should not testify. (Tr., p.48, L.2 - p.55, L.1, p.57, L.7 - p.58, L.22, p.63, L.4 p.67, L.7, p.69, Ls.1-18.) Mr. Rossignol never "insisted" that he be allowed to testify
although he stated to Mr. Ramalingam that, "he was very upset that he wasn't going to
be able to testify; that we didn't want him to testify." (Tr., p.55, Ls.2-10, p.67, Ls.8-15.)
Mr. Ramilingam testified that he did not recall telling Mr. Rossignol that he could
overrule his attorneys' insistence that he not testify, but they never told him that it was
their final decision either. (Tr., p.69, Ls.19-22.) The district court took the case under
advisement. (Tr., p.110, L.25.)
The district court entered a written order denying Mr. Rossignol post-conviction
relief. (R., pp.229-239.) Regarding Mr. Rossignol's claim that he was deprived of his
right to testify, the district court analyzed the issue both as a question of whether he was
denied a fundamental due process right, and as a question of whether his counsel was
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based again upon the court's belief that the evidence showed Mr. Rossignol was guilty,
Dr. Schmidt's testimony would not have had a great impact on the jury because he was
not a psychologist, that it was "highly improbable" that S.R. would have revealed
anything because either Mr.

Rossignol or his wife accompanied

her to her

appointments, and that the alleged abuse "was sexual, not necessarily overtly physical"
and any physical indications of abuse would likely have disappeared prior to S.R.
seeing Dr. Schmidt. (R., pp.236-237.)
Mr.

Rossignol filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court's

Memorandum Decision and Order denying his petition for post-conviction relief.

(R. pp.229-239, 242-244.)
I

7

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rossignol's Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief As He Showed By A Preponderance Of The Evidence That His Counsel Was
Ineffective In Failing To Inform Him That It Was His Decision Whether To Testify,
Regardless Of His Attorneys' Advice, And Had He Testified, There Is A Reasonable
Probability That The Result Of The Trial Would Have Been Different
A.

Introduction
The district court's finding that Mr. Rossignol knew that he had a right to testify is

not in dispute. The question is whether Mr. Rossignol knew that his right to testify was
not limited by his attorney's advice, i.e., whether Mr. Rossignol knew that the choice of
whether to exercise his right to testify was ~1is, and was not for his counsel to determine.
Mr. Rossignol asserts that there is no evidence to support the district court's apparent
finding that Mr. Rossignol was informed that it was his choice on whether or not to
exercise his right to testify, rather than his attorney's choice, and the district court erred
in failing to find that his counsel were deficient. Furthermore, Mr. Rossignol asserts that
the district court erred in finding that Mr. Rossignol would have been convicted even if
he had testified.

B.

The District Court Erred In Finding That Mr. Rossignol Was Not Denied His Sixth
Amendment Right To The Effective Assistance Of Counsel In His Counsels'
Failure To Inform Him That He Had The Choice On Whether To Exercise His
Right To Testify
Upon review of a district court's denial of a petition for post-conviction relief when

an evidentiary hearing has occurred, Idaho's appellate courts will not disturb the district
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho
695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999), citing I.R.C.P. 52(a); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho
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Amendment. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 762 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 482 U.S. 44 (1987)).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that a defendant has the ultimate authority
over the decision whether or not to testify and that, while counsel should advise the
defendant on the propriety of exercising that right, counsel must ultimately abide by the
defendant's wishes. State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 689, 690 (Ct. App. 1989).
In Aragon, the Idaho Supreme Court declined the opportunity to determine
whether or not counsel acts deficiently by failing to advise the defendant the ultimate
decision on whether or not to testify lies with the defendant. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 762763. Based upon the facts of that case, the Aragon Court determined that the petitioner
was not denied his right to testify in large part due to counsel's testimony that, "I don't
think there was any questions but that he realized that he was well aware that he could
testify. In fact, there is no question in my mind that he knew he could testify." Id. at
763. Furthermore, the Aragon Court held that a trial court is not required to obtain an
on-the-record waiver of a defendant's right to testify merely because the defense does
not call the defendant as a witness. Id.
Idaho Court's recognize that a criminal defendant makes the ultimate choice on
whether or not to testify on his or her own behalf, yet the district court is not required to
inform the defendant of his or her right to make this choice. As a knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent decision on whether to exercise this choice requires the defendant to
actually know that he or she has this choice to make, Mr. Rossignol asserts that this
Court should hold defense counsel acts constitutionally deficiently when counsel fails to

5

See
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/crimina[justice_section_archive/crimjust_stan
dards_dfunc_blk.html#5.1 (last accessed August 15, 2011 ).
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(Tr., p.69, Ls.19-22.) Additionally, while the district court informed Mr. Rossignol that he
had the right to testify, his knowledge of which is not in dispute, the court did not inform
Mr. Rossignol that the decision on whether to exercise that right was his to make.
(State's pre-trial Exhibit 1 (audio of arraignment).)7
The district court found that Mr. Rossignol was a very assertive person and that,
had he really wanted to testify, he would have. (R., pp.233-234.) Therefore, the court
concluded, Mr. Rossignol must have merely acquiesced to his counsels' advice that he
not testify. However, in order to assert ones' right, one must understand the parameters
of that right.

Like all other individuals, Mr. Rossignol's ability to assert his rights is

limited by his understanding of the right he wishes to assert. In short, while the facts
undisputedly show that Mr. Rossignol knew that he had the right to testify, the equally
undisputed evidence does not affirmatively show that Mr. Rossignol was ever informed
that the right to testify includes the ability to overrule the objections of his defense
counsel.
Mr. Rossignol asserts that he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
his counsels' performance was deficient in failing to inform him that, as the defendant,

6

Mr. Marshall did not testify on this point of contention either during the evidentiary
hearing or through an affidavit submitted by the State in support of a prior-filed motion
for summary dismissal. (R., pp.114-117; Tr., p.42, L.2 - p.62, L.17.)
7
The State filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and attached Exhibit 1, a disk
containing some transcripts bearing Supreme Court docket number 34374, certain
documents filed in the underlying criminal action including the court minutes for
Mr. Rossignol's arraigment, and an audio recording of Mr. Rossignol's arraignment. (R.,
pp.94-98, p.251.) Based upon the district court's statement that it was taking judicial
notice of the entire underlying criminal file (Tr., p.9, L.12 - p.10, L.10), and the district
court's statement that the court informed Mr. Rossignol of his right to testify (R., pp.233234 ), Mr. Rossignol asserts that this Court can rely upon these items in ruling on this
issue. The audio recording reveals that while the district court informed Mr. Rossignol
13

Mr. Rossignol's testimony would have centered on the fact that he loved his
daughter and would not do the things that he was alleged to have done. (Tr., p.19, L.22
- p.20, L.13.) He would have explained that his lack of visiting S.R. when she was in
Wyoming was not because he did not love her; rather, he was trying to take care of his
obligations to the legal system. (Tr., p.20, L.13 - p.21, L.4.) Mr. Rossignol would have
explained to the jury that he was basically a new father and he and his wife, Nancy,
struggled with how to handle issues that came up with S.R., not that they were unwilling
to do so.

(Tr., p.21, Ls.11-21.)

Mr. Rossignol would have testified that his forgery

conviction resulted from a poor decision made out of desperation and further would
have testified that he lied during the custody hearing about the details of this conviction.
(Tr., p.22, L.4 - p.23, L.6, p.43, L.6 - p.44, L.21.)
Mr. Rossignol was not required to prove that he would have unquestionably been
acquitted had he testified at trial; rather, he was merely required to show a reasonable
probability that the result would have been different. In light of his expected testimony,
the fact that there was good reason to believe the jury wanted to hear from him, and the
fact that the jury struggled for four days and sought further definition of "reasonable
doubt," Mr. Rossignol met his burden and the district court erred in denying his postconviction petition.
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Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), or the defendant will prevail on his
claim. Darbin, 109 Idaho at 520-523.
Mr. Rossignol asserts that any waiver of his right to testify was not knowing,
voluntarily, and intelligent, as his counsel did not inform him that he could make the final
decision on whether or not he would testify. His arguments in support of this assertion
are contained in section 1(8)(2) above and need not be repeated but are incorporated
herein.

Furthermore, Mr. Rossignol asserts that the State did not prove, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the deprivation of his right to testify was harmless.

His

arguments in support of this assertion are contained in section 1(8)(3) above and need
not be repeated but are incorporated herein. In sum, Mr. Rossignol asserts that he was
deprived of his right to testify and the violation of this right was not harmless; therefore,
the district court erred in denying his petition for post-conviction relief.

111.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rossignol's Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief Because, Had Dr. Schmidt Testified, There Is A Reasonable Probability That The
Result Of The Trial Would Have Been Different
The district court found that Mr. Rossignol's counsels' performance was deficient,
as they failed to timely subpoena Dr. Schmidt to testify.

(R.,

pp.235-236.)

Mr. Rossignol asserts that the district court's finding in this regard is correct and
supported by substantial and competent evidence.

However, the district court found

that there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been
different had Dr. Schmidt testified.

(R., pp.236-238.)

Mr. Rossignol asserts that the

district court erred in denying him post-conviction relief on this basis.
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